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From a post-war peak of over 15,000 banks in 1984, the number of commercial banks
in the United States had declined to 10,741 ten years later, and continues to fall. Banks
disappear primarily for one of two reasons: either they fail, or they are acquired by (or
merge with) another bank.’ Since 1984, the number of acquisitions has been roughly four
times the number of failures, even counting acquisitions ofinsolvent banks only as failures.
Moreover, while the number of failures has declined sharply since 1990, acquisitions con-
tinue at a record pace. The enactment ofnew interstate banking and branching authority
portends even more acquisitions in the future, with the possibility of a radical change in
the market structure ofthe U.S. banking industry.
Several studies have sought to identify the characteristics that cause banks to fail.2
Apart from excessive risk-taking, or simply bad luck, banks that are poorly managed are
thought to be prone to failure.3 By contrast, the characteristics that determine whether
a bank will be a takeover target have received comparatively little attention.4 One hy-
pothesis, discussed by Hannan and Rhodes (1987), suggests that poorly-managed banks
are likely targets for acquisition by bankers who think they can enhance the target’s man-
agement quality, and hence its profitability and value. Fundamentally, an acquirer will
evaluate whether the expected profit stream generated by an acquisition, less any costs of
consummating the takeover and reorganization, exceed the price it must pay to acquire
the bank. Ifan acquirer expects a particular acquisition to generate high profits, or entail
‘Throughout the paper we use “acquisitions” and “mergers” interchangeably. Acquisitions greatly
outnumber mergers and our data source, the National Information Center (NIC) database, does not
distinguish between acquisitions and mergers.
2See Thomson (1991) for a recent example and survey.
3See, for example, Berger and Humphrey (1992a) and Barr and Siems (1994).
4Several studies have examined the effect of mergers on bank performance, including Neely (1987),
Berger and Humphrey (1992b), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Linder and Crane (1992) and Akhavein,
Berger and Humphrey (1996). We are aware of just two studies examining the characteristics affecting
the likelihood that a bank will be taken over. Hannan and Rhodes (1987) find no relationship between a
bank’s performance, measured by either rate of return or rate of return relative to market competitors,
and the probability of acquisition. Amel and Rhodes (1989), however, find a negative relationship between
performance and acquisition.relatively low reorganization costs, it might willingly pay a considerable premium over
book value to acquire a controlling interest in another bank. When the expected profit
stream is relatively modest, or significant costs ofreorganization are anticipated, however,
an acquirer might be unwilling to pay such a high purchase price.5 Because ofthis tradeoff,
we have no a priori expectation that poorly-managed banks will have a higher probability
ofbeing acquired — that is an empirical question, and one with considerable relevance for
understanding the likely outcome of continued banking industry consolidation.
Management quality is difficult to measure directly because it can take several forms.
A considerable literature has developed on the measurement of productive efficiency in
banking, however, which conceivably reflects management quality. Researchers have found
that banks in general suffer from considerable managerial, or “x-,” inefficiency, as opposed
to scale orscope inefficiency.6 There are, however, a number ofways to measure managerial
inefficiency. In this paper, we investigate whether managerial inefficiency, measured using
two of the most common techniques, influences the probability of failure or acquisition,
after controlling for bank portfolio characteristics and operating environments. Because
banks may disappear through either failure or acquisition, and since occurrence of either
event precludes the other, we use a competing-risks hazard model framework to identify
characteristics leading to each outcome. Unlike more commonly used discrete-outcome
models, hazard models make more efficient use of the data by explicitly incorporating
information about the timing of alternative outcomes. Also, unlike most other banking
studies, which are typically based on relatively small samples and short periods, we use
quarterly data for 1984-93 on the universe of U.S. banks in existence in 1984 to examine
5Note that because the expected acquisition costs and profits generated by an acquisition will differ
among potential acquirers, no two potential acquirers will necessarily be willing to pay the same price for
controlling interest ina given bank. Just as a handyperson may be willing to buy a “fixer-upper” house
at a price that other buyers would not pay, some bankers specialize in purchasing inefficient banks with
the aim of improving their management and, hence, value, while other bankers might prefer to acquire
well-managed banks.
6Berger and Humphrey (1991) is perhaps the most important article in this literature. See Berger,
Hunter and Timme (1993) for a survey.
—2—both failures and acquisitions.
Federal regulators evaluate banks on five criteria: capital adequacy, asset quality, man-
agement, earnings and liquidity (CAMEL). We base our empirical model on these criteria,
and identify a number of characteristics significantly affecting the likelihood that a bank
will disappear because of failure or acquisition. Not surprisingly, we find that highly-
leveraged banks, banks with low earnings, low liquidity, or risky asset portfolios are more
likely to fail than other banks. Holding other factors constant, we find that banks located
in states that permit branching are less likely to fail, indicating perhaps the benefits of ge-
ographic diversification. And, finally, we find strong evidence that managerial inefficiency
increases the likelihood ofbank failure.
We also find that proximity to insolvency strongly affects the likelihood that a bank will
be acquired. All else equal, the less-well capitalized a bank is, the greater the probability
that it will be acquired, suggesting the acquisition of some banks just before they become
insolvent. We also find that banks with low earnings, low liquidity, or relatively high
non-performing loan ratios are less attractive takeover targets. Banks located in states
permitting branching, as well as small banks in general, have been more likely to be ac-
quired. And, finally, we find that inefficient banks are less likely to be acquired, controlling
for leverage and other balance sheet and environmental characteristics. Managerial ineffi-
ciency could reflect excessive use of, or payment for, physical plant or labor, or excessive
deposit interest cost. The cost of reorganizing an inefficient bank could thus be high~7
Moreover, managerial inefficiency might be taken as a signal of potential problems that
are themselves unobservable (e.g., bad loans or accounting irregularities). Thus, holding
other portfolio and environmental conditions constant, acquirers on average apparently
prefer not to purchase inefficient banks.
7Large layoffs of personnel or branch closings are sometimes necessary to improve a bank’s efficiency.
Perhaps because such actions can entail considerable cost, both monetarily and in terms of public relations,
studies have generally found few cost efficiency gains associated with acquisitions and mergers of banks.
Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1996), for example, find almost no such gains for recent mergers of large
bank holding companies.
—3—Section 2 describes productive efficiency and the measures we use. We also discuss the
data used to measure efficiency and the results ofthe efficiency estimation in this section.
Section 3 describes the hazard model and the data used to control for portfolio charac-
teristics and other factors, while Section 4 presents the results of the hazard estimation.
Conclusions are discussed in the final section.
2. THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY
2.1 Definitions and Models
To measure productive inefficiency, one must first define an input/output mapping.
Banks use a number of inputs to produce a myriad of financial services, and to study
efficiency researchers are forced to employ simplified modelsofbank production. Typically,
banks are viewed as transforming various financial resources, as well as labor and physical
plant, into loans, other investments and, sometimes, deposits. One view, termed the
production approach, measures bank production in terms of the numbers of loans and
deposit accounts serviced. The more common intermediation approach measures outputs
in terms of the dollar amounts of loans and deposits. The production approach includes
only operating costs, whereas the intermediation approach includes both operating costs
and interest expense, and hence is probably of more interest for studying the viability of
banks. In this study we adopt the intermediation approach.8
Researchers have used various criteria to identify the specific inputs and outputs to
include in models of bank production. Typically, various categories of loans are included
as outputs, while funding sources, labor and physical plant are treated as inputs. The
categorization of deposits varies across studies. Whereas non-transactions deposits are
almost always treated as inputs, transactions deposits are sometimes considered to be
outputs. In the absence of a consensus on the specification of an input/output mapping,
we follow Kaparakis et at. (1994), which is somewhat representative.
8See Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) or Ferrier and Lovell (1990) for further discussion ofthese
approaches.
—4—There are various notions of productive efficiency, as well as different techniques for
measuring each type of inefficiency (see Lovell, 1993 for discussion). In order to check
robustness, we use a parametric stochastic frontier model to estimate cost inefficiency, as
well as nonparametric distance functions to estimate input and output technical ineffi-
ciency. Although Berger and Humphrey (1991) find that technical inefficiencies comprise
the vast majority of cost inefficiency in banks, the parametric and nonparametric esti-
mation methodologies have led to very different estimates of efficiency (e.g., Ferrier and
Lovell, 1990). Our choice of efficiency concepts and estimation methods broadly reflects
those used in bank efficiency studies.
Among parametric models used in recent banking studies, the translog specification has
probably been the most common choice for variable cost functions. For the input/output
specificationused by Kaparakis et al. (1994), the corresponding variable cost function may
be written as
logC =a0 + aj log1’~ + ~ /3~ log~k + itjk logY~ logYk
j=1 k=1 j=lk=1
+ ~ 6~log Pj log Pk + ~ rjk log1~ logPk + ~olog X0 (2.1)
j=lk=1 j=lk=1
+ ~j log ~ logXo + ~/j logo logXo + ~(logXo)2 + e
where C denotes variable cost, Yj denotes the ith output, Pk denotes the jth input price,
X0 is a fixed input, all lograrithms are natural, anda, /3, ‘y, 6, it, ~, ~ and r are parameters
to be estimated. The Kaparakis et al. input/output mapping includes four outputs, four
variable inputs, and one quasifixed input (these are discussed later). Linear homogeneity
in input prices implies the restrictions ~ /33 1; >~, 8jk = 0 V Ic; ~ Tjk = 0 Vj;
and >~, ~ = 0. In addition, we restrict itjk = ir~ V j, Ic and 6jk = 6kj V j, k. As in
Kaparakis et at., we also specify a composite error structure
E=V+u (2.2)
—5—with v N(0, o~),u = UI, and U ~.‘ N(0, o~).The v term in (2.2) represents stochastic
noise, whileu captures cost inefficiency. Maximum likelihood estimates areobtained along
the lines of Aigner et at. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977); the inefficiency
term is estimated for each firm in the sample by computing the conditional expectation
E(ujE = e) as described by Jondrow et at. (1982).
To obtain nonparametric estimates of technical efficiency, we use the Shephard (1970)
input and output distance functions computed (respectively) by solving the linear pro-
grams:
= min{A I y~ ~ Yq~,\x~> Xq~,iqj = 1, qj E R~} (2.3)
and
(~~t) —1 = max{~ I ~ <Yq~,x~> Xq~,iqj = 1, qj E R~}, (2.4)
where V = [y, ... YN], X = [x, ... XN], with x~and ~j denoting the (n x 1) and (m x 1)
vectors of observed inputs and outputs for the ith bank (i = 1,... , N), x3 R~and
y3 R~for all j = 1,... ,N, and where i is a (1 x N) vector of ones and q is a (N x 1)
vector of intensity variables which serve to form a piecewise linear approximation of the
technology.9
Both D~and D~ measure the radial distance from an observed point (xi, yj) to the
boundary of the convex hull ofthe sample observations, and are invariant with respect to
units ofmeasurement. The input distance function in (2.3) measures the maximumfeasible
proportionate reduction in inputs, subject to the existing technology, holdingoutputs fixed.
By definition, D~~ 1, withD~= 1 indicating that bank i is ostensibly efficient.’°Larger
values of D~indicate increasing inefficiency. Similarly, the output distance function in
(2.4) measures the maximum feasible proportionate expansion of outputs, holding inputs
9The formulations in (2.3)—(2.4) implicitly assume that (i) the underlying production set is closed,
convex; (ii) all production requires use of some inputs; and (iii) both inputs and outputs are strongly
disposable. The constraint iq~= 1 imposes variable returns to scale on the reference technology; other
returns to scale may be imposed by modifying this constraint (e.g., see Grosskopf, 1986).
‘°If~ = 1, then bank i lies on the boudary of the convex hull of the sample observations; this may
or may not correspond to the true boundary of the underlying production set.
—6—fixed. By definition, D~t< 1 with ~ = 1 indicating that bank i is ostensibly efficient;
smaller values ofD~tindicate increasing inefficiency.
Thedistance functions in (2.3)—(2.4) resemble other linear-programming-based efficiency
measures which are collectively referred to as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in the
literature.” DEA methods have been widely applied in banking (e.g., see Ferrier and
Lovell, 1990; Barr et at., 1993; and Wheelock and Wilson, 1995) as well as other areas
(e.g., Fare et at., 1994). The measures we have chosen are representative of those used in
the banking literature.
While cost and technical inefficiency are closely related concepts, the techniques used
to measure them are quite different and involve several tradeoffs. The cost function in
(2.1) requires specification of specific funtional forms for the cost function itself as well
as for the distributions of noise and inefficiency; specification error, which would lead
to biased and inconsistent estimation, is an ever-present possibility with this approach.
Among parametric forms, the translog form in (2.1) is typically regarded as being rather
flexible, although its use would be problematic in small samples. Moreover, parametric
assumptions required on the densities of u and v in (2.2) may be restrictive.
Because no parametric assumptions are required, the DEA approach offers more flex-
ible forms of the technology and distributions of inefficiency than does estimation of the
translog cost function. The DEA methods do not allow fornoise, however, and thus, when
DEA measures are used, any noise in the underlying data-generating process will be con-
fused with inefficiency. Apart from this problem, DEA methods give consistent estimates
of inefficiency under appropriate assumptions about the underlying data-generating pro-
cess, but suffer from the usual statistical inefficiency problems incurred in nonparametric
estimation (Kneip et at., 1996).12
“Shephard (1970) and Fare (1988) give further details on the measures in (2.3)—(2.4), while Lovell
(1993) discusses DEA methods in general.
12This implies that even if the data-generating process does not involve a noise process as in (2.1), DEA
methods may yield noisy, imprecise estimates of inefficiency in finite samples due to sampling variation
(we return to this point in Secton 4). On the other hand, inconsistency due to misspecification of the
—7—2.2 The Data
Ourdata aretaken from the quarterly Statements ofIncome and Condition (callreports)
filed by commercial banks. We use end-of-quarter data from 1984(3) through 1993(4),
giving a total of 38 quarters. Following Kaparakis et al. (1994), we specify four outputs,
four variable inputs, and one quasi-fixed input. The outputs are: loans to individuals for
household, family, and other personal expenses (Y,); real estate loans (Y2); commercial
and industrial loans (Y3); and federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to
resell, plus total securities heldin trading accounts (Y4). The variable inputs are: interest-
bearing deposits except certificates ofdeposit greater than $100,000 (X,); purchased funds
(certificates of deposit greater than $100,000, federal funds purchased, and securities sold
plus demandnotes) and other borrowed money (X2); number ofemployees (X3); and book
value of premises and fixed assets (X4).
The quasi-fixed input (X0) consists ofnoninterest-bearing deposits. Kaparakis et at. ar-
gue that since, by definition, banks cannot attract more ofthese deposits by offering inter-
est, they can be regarded as exogenously determined as a first approximation. Although
banks might offer various services or other incentives to attract non-interest bearing de-
posits, we assume that banks take the quantity of these deposits as given. Because no
explicit price exists for this input, it must either be omitted from the cost function alto-
gether, or its quantity rather than price must be included in the cost function. Following
Kaparakis et at., we opt for the latter.
Input prices are computed as follows: average interest cost per dollar ofX, (P,); average
interest cost per dollar of X2 (P2); average annual wage per employee (P3); and average
cost ofpremises and fixed assets (P4). Our computation of input prices is identical to that
of Kaparakis et at. and others.’3 As is typical, we compute the dependent variable (C) in
technology or the distribution of inefficiency does not appear to be a problem when DEA methods are
used.
‘3Computing input prices in terms of average expense for each input may result in measurement error.
Kaparakis et al. discuss alternative specifications for some price variables, but these are also likely to
introduce significant measurement error.
—8—(2.1) as the total cost of the variable inputs; i.e.,
C = ~ (2.8)
The Call Reports contain information on banks whose business does not involve the
traditional banking operations reflected in our input/output mapping (e.g., credit-card
banks), and nonparametric efficiency measures in particular are sensitive to outliers in
the data. We therefore employ several selection criteria to limit our sample to a group of
relatively homogenous banks. In particular, we omit banks with foreign branches, banks
with nonpositive values for inputs, outputs, or prices, and banks reporting assets of less
than $50,000 (1986 dollars). Since some remaining observations contain values for P1 and
P2 that are suspect, we omit observations when either of these variables exceeded 0.45.’~
Finally, we include only those banks operating in 1984(3), the beginning of our sample
period. The number of observations in each quarter ranges from 2967 to 5530.
2.3 Efficiency Estimation Results
Estimation of the frontier cost function represented in (2.1) is straightforward.’5 We
estimate a series of cross-sectional relationships rather than a panel data model to allow
for the possibility that inefficiency varies over time. The parameter estimates for the cost
function in (2.1) vary a great deal over the 32 quarters in which convergence was achieved,
suggesting that the technology shifted over time.16
The nonparametric measures of efficiency are obtained by solving the linear programs
(2.3)—(2.4). Although time-consuming, the linear programs have a solution in eachinstance
14We arrived at this criteria by examining the distributions of the price variables; the distributions
were somewhat continuous up to some point below 0.45, with a few (clearly implausible) large outliers in
the right tail.
‘5We used procedures contained in LIMDEP version 6.0 to compute the cost function estimates; see
the LIMDEP Version 6.0 User’s Manual and Reference Guide, Econometric Software, Inc., Beliport, NY
(1992). Nonparametric estimates were computed using Fortran code written by the authors.
‘6We omit the parameter estimates to conserve space; the actual values are available on request. In
the six quarters where convergence was not achieved, initial ordinary least squares estimation (to obtain
starting values) yielded residuals skewed in the correct direction; hence, failure to acheive convergence in
these quarters may reflect poor starting values rather than specification problems (see Greene, 1993).
—9—and hence we are able to obtain efficiency estimates for each period. To compute both the
input and output distance function measures of efficiency, (2.3)—(2.4) are each solved once
for each bank in each cross section. Each time the equations are solved, efficiency for the
ith bank at time t is measured relative to the convex hull of observations on the N~banks
observed at time t.
Mean values of the cost inefficiency estimates from (2.1) are shown in Table 1. For
each quarter in which the data needed to compute efficiency are available, mean cost in-
efficiencies of all banks that neither failed nor were acquired at any time before 1994(2)
are reported in the column labeled “Survived.” The number ofobservations changes from
quarter to quarter because two successive Call Reports are needed to compile cost figures
foreach bank, and many banks have missingdata for one or more ofthe necessary variables
in any given quarter. Mean cost inefficiency for banks that failed (defined here as closure
by regulators) within one year after the given quarter are reported in the column labelled
“Failed,” and means for banks that were acquired within one year after the quarter are
reported in the column labeled “Acquired.” For each period, we use the bootstrap proce-
dure described by Atkinson and Wilson (1995) with 1000 replications to test for significant
differences in mean efficiency measures for failed versus survived banks and acquired versus
survived banks. Asterisks in Tables 1—3 indicate differences in means that are significant
at 95 percent.’7
Consistent with Berger and Humphrey (1992a) and others, we find that failing banks
almost always were more cost-inefficient than surviving banks, though in several periods
the differences in mean inefficiency are not statistically significant. By contrast, acquired
banks were, on average, almost always less inefficient than survivors, and the differences
in mean inefficiency between acquired and surviving banks are almost always statistically
significant. There may well be other important characteristics that affect the likelihood
~ numbers of observations for failed banks in each quarter, together with nonnormality of the
efficiency scores, precludes use of conventional t-ratios.
— 10 —that a bank will be acquired, but it appears that inefficient banks are less likely to be
acquired than efficient banks.
Tables 2 and 3 report means for the nonparametric measures oftechnical inefficiency (in
Table 3 we report means ofthe inverse output efficiency measure to facilitate comparison
with the other efficiency measures). In contrastto the cost inefficiency results, failing banks
often appear less technically inefficient than surviving banks. Ofcourse, this analysis does
not control for other possible determinants of failure, but from this comparison failing
banks do not appear consistently more technically inefficient than surviving banks, As
with the cost inefficiency estimates reported in Table 1, we find that acquired banks were
less technically inefficient than surviving banks, regardless ofwhether technical inefficiency
is measured using the input orientation or the output orientation. Thus, whereas the
parametric cost inefficiency measure and the nonparametric technical inefficiency measures
provide estimates ofthe relationship between managerial inefficiency and bank failure that
are inconsistent with one another, both measures indicate that, at least during 1984—93,
banks that were acquired were generally less inefficient than banks that failed or survived
the decade.
We next investigate whether the relationships between efficiency, failure and acquisi-
tion suggested by comparison of means continue to hold once other likely characteristics
affecting the probability of failure or acquisiton are controlled for.
3. MODELING THE TIME-TO-DISAPPEARANCE
We wish to examine the hazard, or risk, of banks disappearing due either to acquisition
or to failure, which we refer to as events in the following discussion. We assume that the
causal processes for acquisitions and failures are different. As shown below, our empirical
results support this assumption.
Either acquisition or failure removes a bank from risk of the other event; this has been
labelled competing risks in the duration model literature. Conceivably, failure and ac-
— 11 —quisiton times may be dependent on one another, for example if banks are acquired just
before they would otherwise have failed. However, without additional information, any
dependent competing risks model is observationally equivalent to an independent compet-
ing risks model.’8 Fortunately, our data contain additional information which allow us
to handle this problem. By including a key indicator of failure—the ratio of equity to
assets—in the acquisition hazard, we provide a test ofwhether proximity to failure affects
the likelihood of a bank’s acquisition. This is the approach suggested by Kalbfleisch and
Prentice (1980, pp. 175—177).
We analyze the disappearance of banks using Cox (1972) proportional hazards models
with time-varying covariates, which are estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood
function. Our estimation is thus semiparametric, since we do not specifiy the baseline
hazards. This approach is standard in most applied work (e.g., see Katz and Meyer,
1990). In modelling the failure hazard, acquired banks are treated as censored at the
date of acquisition; in modelling the acquisition hazard, banks that failed are treated as
censored at the failure date. This approach assumes that censoring does not provide any
information about latent failure times beyond that available in the covariates.
Our sample consists of banks operating in 1984(3), the beginning ofour sample period.
Weupdate the data on these banks over the next 38 quarters, through December 31, 1993,
in the hazard estimation. Through time, failure, acquisition, or simply missing data cause
banks to disappear. Banks are treated as censored when they are missing from the Call
Reports for more than three consecutive quarters, but have not failed or been acquired.’9
Since the balance sheets of failing banks may change drastically in the months before
181n other words, dependent hazards can be modelled using appropriate multivariate distributions, but
the data are unable to distinguish between dependent and independent models; i.e., for each dependent
model, there will be a corresponding independent model which yields the same likelihood value. Without
additional information, one cannot test the null hypothesis of independence, nor test hypotheses regarding
the structure ofthe dependence. See Elandt-Johnson and Johnson (1980) and Lancaster (1990) for proofs;
Kalbfieisch and Prentice, (1980, pp. 172-175) provide an example.
19These banks are treated as censored on the day before the date of the first Call Report from which
they are missing.
— 12 —failure, by treating banks with missing data as censored, we avoid biasing the results by
using information from the distant past to describe characteristics of banks at the time of
their failure.20
Each bank i in the sample is observed at J~different times t~1< t~2< ... < t,j~,
with either failure, acquisition, or censoring occurring at time ~ Time is measured by
calendar time sincethe first observation date, which is identical forall banks in the sample,
so that t~,= 0 V i. The data used in z corresponding to time tjj, j = 1,... , (J~ — 1),
are assumed to reflect the position of bank i over the interval ~ ti(j+,)). The estimated
model is time-varying in that the covariates in z are assumed constant for intervals of time
[ti,,t~(j+,)), but mayvary across intervals. Thus for the ith bank there are (J~ —1) censored
observations whose contribution to the likelihood is given by [S(t~(j+,)Iz, 0) — S(t2~Iz, 0)],
where S(.) is the survivor function; again, the J2th observation represents either failure,
acquisition, or censoring.
In choosing covariates for the hazard models, we attempt to account for capital ade-
quacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and miscellaneous factors. Specifi-
cally, we define the following variables:2’
1. Capital adequacy:
CAPAD = total equity/total assets.
2. Asset quality:
Al = total loans/total assets.
A2 = real estate loans/total loans.
A3 = other real estate owned/total assets.
= income earned, but not collected on loans/total assets.
20Unfortunately, many banks do not submit Call Reports for several quarters before their failure dates;
our scheme treats these as censored observations. Of 1392 banks closed by the FDIC due to failure during
1984(3)—1993(4), we observe only 281 banks in the Call Report data within three quarters prior to the date
of failure. Our approach is conservative; to the extent wetreat failed banks as censored, significance levels
will be reduced when we estimate the failure hazard. Data on 4061 banks are used in the hazard models.
Of these banks, 1387 are observed to be acquired between 9/30/84 and 3/31/94, while 281 are reported as
failing during the same period. While efficiency estimates could be obtained for a larger number of banks,
additional data requirements in the hazard models reduced the number of banks.
21 specification attempts to account for the principal components ofthe CAMEL ratings assigned
by regulators in their evaluations of individual banks. Note that balance sheet items are reported as book
values; we convert all dollar figures to 1986 dollars using the quarterly gross national product deflator.
—13— ~A5 = commercial and industrial loans/total loans.
3. Management:
Ml = cost inefficiency.
M~ = input distance function measure oftechnical inefficiency.
M3 = 1/output distance function measure of technical inefficiency.
4. Earnings:
EARN = net income after taxes/total assets.
5. Liquidity:
LIQ (federal funds purchased — fed funds sold)/total assets.
6. Miscellaneous factors:
SIZE = log of total assets.
HOLD = 1 if 25% or more of equity is held by a multi-bank holding company;
0 otherwise.
BR1 = 1 if bank is located in a state allowing limited branching; 0 otherwise.
BR2 = 1 if bank is located in a state allowing unlimited branching; 0 otherwise.
In estimating the failure hazard, we expect the coefficient on CAPADto have a negative
sign, indicating that banks with higher equity as a percentage oftotal assets should be less
likely to fail. Obviously, the less equity a bank has, the less protection it has against loan
losses or other declines in the value of its assets.
Loans are typically the least liquid and most risky of bank assets. Thus, we expect that
the more concentrated a bank’s assets are in loans, the greater the likelihood of failure,
and hence we expect a positive coefficient on Al. In the absence of direct information
about the riskiness or quality of a bank’s loan portfolio, we include two measures of loan
concentration by category, and two measures of loan portfolio performance. We include
the ratios ofreal estate loans to total loans and ofcommercial and industrial loans to total
loans to test whether concentration in either category affects the probability of failure.
The variables A3 and A~ are indicators ofasset quality. “Other real estate owned” reflects
foreclosed property, and higher values could indicate problem loans. Similarly, a high level
of earned, but uncollected loan income might also indicate that a bank’s loan portfolio
quality is low. Thus, the coefficients on A3 and A4 are expected to be positive.
— 14 —We use the various measures of inefficiency (Ml—M3) to reflect management quality;
each is constructed so that larger values reflect greater inefficiency. From the discussion
in Section 2, we expect the coefficients on each to be positive in the failure hazard. For
the quarters in which the cost function (2.1) could not be estimated, Ml is set equal to
its value in the previous quarter, Although this may introduce measurement error, no
alternative is evident if parametric efficiency estimates are to be used.22
Banks with greater earnings are, presumably, less likely to fail, and hence we expect a
negative coefficient on EARN.Positive values ofLIQindicatenet purchases offederal funds,
which might indicate illiquidity. If illiquid banks are more likely to fail, the coefficient on
LIQ should be positive.23
We use the log of total assets to measure bank size. Casual empiricism suggests that
small banks may be more likely to fail. If this remains true after controlling for other
factors, the coefficient on SIZE should be negative. We include HOLD to test whether
membership in a multi-bank holding company affects the probability of failure. For exam-
ple, if a parent company injects cash into a weak subsidiary, holding company membership
might lessen the chance offailure. On the other hand, the failure ofa lead bank in a holding
company has sometimes led regulators to close all holding company members. Although
we are uncertain about the likely sign on HOLD, including it in the hazard model should
lead to more precise estimates of the coefficients of the remaining variables. Finally, we
include branching dummy variables to test whether the opportunity to branch enhanced
geographic diversification and thereby lessened the chance of failure. If so, the coefficients
on BR1 and BR2 should be negative.
In estimating the hazard models, we define bank failure two different ways. First, we
treat only those banks that were closed by the FDIC as failed. Some banks, however,
22This is entirely within the spirit of time-varying covariates hazard models, since we update variables
whenever new information becomes available.
23Unfortunately, missing data for many banks prevented use of a broader measure ofliquidity including
currency, coin and US Treasury securities, as well as net fed funds purchased.
— 15 —were allowed to remain in operation for quite some time after becoming insolvent, in some
cases operating for several quarters with negative equity. Because of regulatory action,
the precise timing of failure is sometimes arbitrary. Hence, our second definition of bank
failure expands the first to also include banks with total equity capital less goodwilldivided
by total assets of less than two percent. For these banks, the failure date is taken as the
earlier of (1) the reported date of closure or (2) the day before the Call Report on which
the equity ratio is observed below two percent.24
We are unaware of any studies that attempt to estimate acquisition hazards. As a
starting point, we use the same variables as in our failure hazard specifications. Casual
observation again suggests that small banks are more likely takeover targets, and so we
expect a negative sign on SIZE. With respect to the management variables, buyers may
look for poorly-managed banks whose values could be enhanced by superior management.
Inefficient banks represent such opportunities, so we might expect a positive sign on Ml—
M3in the acquisition hazards. Indeed, Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that in a sample
of large bank holding company acquisitions, the acquirer was typically more efficient than
the acquired firm. The acquisition of inefficient banks may entail substantial costs of
reorganization, however, and inefficiency may signal other problems, such as bad loans,
and thus discourage potential acquirors. Hence the effect ofmanagerial inefficiency on the
acquisition hazard is an empirical question.25
Our data on bank acquisitions come from the National Information Center (NIC) data-
base, which is maintained by the Federal Reserve System. The data include information
on the type ofacquisition, banks involved, date ofacquisition, and whether the acquisition
was arranged by the FDIC in the case of failed banks. For purposes of estimating the
24~, additional banks are identifiedas failed under this expanded definition, although the timing ofother
failures is affected. We choose 2 percent as our criteria since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 requires regulators to close or impose prompt corrective action on any bank
whose equity ratio falls below 2 percent.
25Some acquisitions result from holding company reorganizations. To the extent that these reorganiza-
tions have little to do with efficiencyof the “acquired” bank, we would expect the statistical significance
of the efficiency variables Mi—MS and perhaps that of other variables to be reduced.
— 16 —acquisition hazard, we define an acquisition as the purchase ofone bank by another bank,
without thepurchase beingarranged by the FDIC, with the charter ofthe purchased bank
being discontinued, and that ofthe purchasing bank continuing to exist. For some acquired
banks, failure may have been imminent; however, when we use our second, expanded def-
inition of bank failure, we treat such banks as failed if their equity ratio falls below the
two percent level before the reported date of acquisition. Consequently, in the acquisition
hazard, such banks are treated as censored.
4. HAZARD ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1 Time-to-Failure
The results of the hazard model estimation for time-to-failure are reported in Table
4. Results for three pairs of equations are shown, corresponding to the three measures of
inefficiency. Within each pair, two definitions of failure are used: (1) closure by the FDIC,
and (2) an equity/asset ratio below .02. Equations I—Il include cost inefficiency (Ml);
equations Ill—IV include input technical efficiency (Me), while V—VI include the output
technical efficiency measure (M3).
The qualitative results appear robust across both the different efficiency measures and
the failure definitions; signs and significance levels are similar in all six equations. The
financial variables affect the probability offailure largely as anticipated. For example, the
less well-capitalized a bank was, the more likely it was to fail. By the ~me token, failure
was more likely for banks with larger ratios of loans to assets, other real estate owned
to total assets, uncollected loan income to assets, and commercial and industrial loans to
total assets.
Not surprisingly, failure probability was negatively related to earnings. The coefficient
on the liquidity variable is counter to expectations, however, perhaps indicating that it is a
poorproxy. We find no robustly significant relationships between size or holding company
membership and the probability of failure, but we do find that failure was less likely
— 17 —in states permitting either limited or state-wide branching. Apparently, the geographic
diversification afforded by branching reduced the likelihood of failure, holding individual
bank characteristics fixed.
The cost inefficiency variable Ml, and the input technical inefficiency variable M~ both
have positive and statistically significant coefficients. The positive signs indicate that,
holding capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity and other factors constant, the
more inefficient a bank was, the more likely it was to fail. The t-ratios for M2 are lower
than those for Ml, and are insignificant for M3, reflectingat leastin part the incorporation
of noise into the nonparametric efficiency scores as discussed earlier. Our results support
previous research, as well as intuition, however, that managerial inefficiency increases the
likelihood that a bank will fail.
4.2 Time-to-Acquisition
Next, we investigate whether the same variables that explain time-to-failure can also
explain time-to-acquisition. Table 5 reports these results. Again, we distinguish among
alternative types of inefficiency, as well as definitions of failure (failures are treated as
censored observations in the model of acquisition).
In general, we find that the lower a bank’s equity/asset ratio, the more likely it was to
be acquired. As the results in Table 4 illustrate, banks with little equity relative to assets
are at significantly greater risk of failure than other banks. Indeed, insolvency, i.e., an
equity/asset ratio of zero, is the economic definition of failure, and would be the practical
definition as well were it not for regulator determination of bank closure.26 Thus, finding
a negative relationship between the equity/asset ratio and the probability of acquisition
could be interpreted as the closer a bank is to failure, the more likely it is to be acquired.
This does not, however, imply that failure is imminent for all banks that are acquired,
26Apart from the cost of acquiring information about the true financial condition of a bank, with
deposit insurance, depositors have little or no incentive to run on an insolvent bank and thus force closure
at the time of insolvency. Bank closure has thus been left to regulators who monitor “problem” banks and
determine when a bank has failed.
— 18 —though it may be for some. Especially skillful managers might be able to operate banks
safely with little capital, and such banks might be highly profitable or desirable takeover
candidates for other reasons. Nevertheless, thinly capitalizedbanks are generally at greater
risk of failure, and, apparently also ofbeing acquired.
Our results also indicate that banks with higher ratios ofreal estate loans to total loans
had a higher probability of being acquired. Banks with suspect loans, as reflected by high
ratios of interest earned but not collected to total assets were, unsurprisingly, less likely
to be acquired. On the other hand, a lower rate of return on assets increased a bank’s
likelihood of being acquired, as did a low ratio of net fed funds purchased to assets.
Holding other variables constant, smaller banks were more likely to be acquired than
larger banks. Members of holdingcompanies were also more likely to be acquired, as were
banks located in state-wide branch banking states.
Finally, we find that cost inefficiency reduced the probability ofbeing acquired, all else
equal. Not only might the acquisition of an inefficient bank entail higher costs of reorga-
nization than for an efficient bank, but inefficiency might be taken by potential acquirers
as a signal of hidden problems with the bank’s operations. Indeed, for given financial
characteristics and key environmental variables, our results indicate that managerial inef-
ficiency reduces the attractiveness ofbanks to acquirers.27 Acquisition appears unrelated
to technical inefficiency, however, at least as measured by the input and output distance
functions. Given ~hat cost inefficiency and technical inefficiency are in theory similar, re-
lated concepts, the insignificance of technical inefficiency in the acquisition hazard may
reflect noise in these measures.28
27This might also explain why Akhavein et at. (1996) find little improvement in cost efficiencyfollowing
the merger of very large banks, despite the observed potential for large improvement.
28DEA methods are sensitive to outliers. While methods exist to detect outliers in DEA models,
they are difficult to employ with large sample sizes. In addition, as noted earlier, the slow convergence
rates of nonparametric efficiency estimators such as these implies that estimates from small samples will
have high variance due to sampling variation. To the extent that variables in the hazard models contain
noise, we would expect an attenuation effect as with other measurement-error problems that would reduce
significance levels.
— 19 —5. CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. banking system is in a period oftransition. From the mid-1930s through the
1970s, banking markets were insulated, bank profits were stable, and the regulatory and
technological environment in which banks operated changed little. Since 1980, however,
significant changes have increased competition and begun to alter the market structure of
the banking industry. The number of U.S. banks has fallen sharply since 1985, initially
because offailures, but more recently because ofhigh numbers ofacquisitions and mergers.
We have sought to identify the characteristics of banks exiting the industry through either
failure or acquisition, focusing especially on how managerial inefficiency might affect the
likelihood of either outcome.
We find, not surprisingly, that less-well capitalized banks are at greater risk offailure,
as are banks with high ratios ofloans to assets, evidence ofpoor quality loanportfolios and
banks with low earnings. Given bank-specific characteristics, we find that banks located
where branching is permitted hada lower probability of failing, supporting the claim that
enhanced freedomsto branch would afford banks greater diversification and thereby reduce
their vulnerability to localized economic shocks.
We also find that, after controlling for other determinants, the lower a bank’s capital-
ization, the greater the probability that it would be acquired. This is consistent with the
acquisition of failing banks prior to insolvency, but also with the purchase of banks with
skillful managers whoare able to operate successfully with high leverage. We find, however,
that the probability of acquisition declined with higher return on assets. The likelihood
ofacquisition also was higher for banks located in states permitting state-wide branching,
suggesting that industry consolidation will likely follow as branching restrictions continue
to fall.
Finally, we find that the probability of failure was higher for managerially inefficient
banks, as reflected in measures of both cost and technical inefficiency. The likelihood of
acquisition, however, declined with cost inefficiency, and we detect no clear relationship
— 20 —of acquisition with technical inefficiency. Although inefficient banks might be ripe for
takeover by owners who could enhance their management quality, and thereby their value,
we find that, on average, high cost inefficiency has lowered the probability that a bank will
be acquired. Indeed, other studies have found little cost efficiency gain associated with
large bank acquisitions (e.g., Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1996). Apparently, the
costs of reorganizing an inefficient bank and the potential for other hidden problems that
inefficiency might signal, tend to discourage the acquisition of inefficient banks.
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1984(3) 2433 0.1825 9 0.1645 113 0.1507*
1984(4) 1424 0.1835 3 0.1550* 68 0.1520*
1985(1) 2233 0.1923 6 0.2433* 97 0.1562*
1985(2) 1701 0.1854 4 0.1401 76 0.1667
1985(3) 1653 0.1966 6 0.2652* 59 0.1714*
1985(4) 1476 0.1656 8 0.1984* 45 0.1556
1986(1) 2228 0.1894 17 0.2292* 100 0.1619*
1986(2) 1789 0.1963 5 0.2472 72 0.1578*
1986(3) 1492 0.2013 4 0.2760* 101 0.1577*
1986(4) 1491 0.1929 4 0.1662 100 0.1457*
1987(1) 2166 0.1798 13 0.2012 190 0.1476*
1987(2) 1558 0.1919 15 0.2101 159 0.1621*
1987(3) 1412 0.1944 42 0.2136* 138 0.1616*
1987(4) 1412 0.1583 39 0.1504 133 0.1301*
1988(3) 1530 0.1999 28 0.2593* 60 0.1496*
1988(4) 1387 0.2047 22 0.2786* 40 0.1780
1989(1) 2062 0.1879 20 0.2195* 86 0.1633*
1989(3) 1632 0.2079 15 0.2174 77 0.1574*
1989(4) 1625 0.1768 12 0.1776 71 0.1335*
1990(1) 2135 0.1896 26 0.1828 74 0.1422*
1990(2) 1590 0.1878 16 0.1953 58 0.1512*
1990(4) 1420 0.2066 13 0.1876 47 0.1700*
1991(1) 2097 0.1971 21 0.1793 100 0.1682*
1991(2) 1433 0.2225 15 0.2116 72 0.1813*
1991(3) 1546 0.2073 11 0.1510* 64 0.1602*
1992(1) 2050 0.1967 27 0.2400* 87 0.1564*
1992(3) 1353 0.2121 11 0.1765 87 0.1813*
1992(4) 1492 0.1618 7 0.1872* 83 0.1298*
1993(1) 1980 0.1963 9 0.2329* 107 0.1702*
1993(2) 1448 0.1874 2 0.2375 75 0.1534*
1993(3) 1334 0.1733 7 0.2069* 87 0.1532*
1993(4) 1344 0.1459 4 0.1575 75 0.1280*
— 25 —TABLE 2
Mean Input Technical Inefficiency
Survived Failed Acquired
Quarter Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
1984(3) 2433 1.3187 9 1.1657* 113 1.2875
1984(4) 1424 1.3150 3 1.2032 68 1.2839
1985(1) 2233 1.3550 6 1,1602* 97 1.3203
1985(2) 1701 1.3314 4 1.1463 76 1.3387
1985(3) 1653 1.3502 6 1.3618 59 1.3474
1985(4) 1476 1.3490 8 1.4112 45 1.3390
1986(1) 2228 1.3904 17 1.3245 100 1.3675
1986(2) 1789 1.3642 5 1.3321 72 1.2873*
1986(3) 1492 1.3668 4 1.1735 101 1.2548*
1986(4) 1491 1.3776 4 1.1469* 100 1.2336*
1987(1) 2166 1.4269 13 1.3082 190 1.3524*
1987(2) 1558 1.3899 15 1.3406 159 1.2987*
1987(3) 1412 1.4006 42 1.2058* 138 1.2841*
1987(4) 1412 1.3618 39 1.1272* 133 1.2167*
1988(1) 2129 1.4436 49 1.2209* 141 1.2796*
1988(2) 1592 1.4098 48 1.1992* 85 1.3064*
1988(3) 1530 1.3932 28 1.4917* 60 1.2891
1988(4) 1387 1.3847 22 1.3576 40 1.3786
1989(1) 2062 1.4547 20 1.7238* 86 1.4106
1989(2) 1588 1.4431 20 1.4942 75 1.3247*
1989(3) 1632 1.4216 15 1.3374 77 1.3129*
1989(4) 1625 1.4091 12 1.4394 71 1.2313*
1990(1) 2135 1.4523 26 1.4233 74 1.3435*
1990(2) 1590 1.4222 16 1.3053 58 1.4087
1990(3) 1563 1.4239 12 1.2948 61 1.3936
1990(4) 1420 1.4125 13 1.2315* 47 1.3319*
1991(1) 2097 1.4528 21 1.2096* 100 1.4324
1991(2) 1433 1.4292 15 1.1763* 72 1.3757
1991(3) 1546 1.4527 11 1.1091* 64 1.3420*
1991(4) 1263 1.4484 11 1.2695 42 1.3754
1992(1) 2050 1.4774 27 1.5644* 87 1,3542*
1992(2) 1417 1.4399 24 1.3684 73 1.2982*
1992(3) 1353 1.5021 11 1.4059 87 1.3912*
1992(4) 1492 1.4375 7 1.4782 83 1.2330*
1993(1) 1980 1.4932 9 1.5408 107 1.3371*
1993(2) 1448 1.4633 2 1.5926* 75 1.2822*
1993(3) 1334 1.4628 7 1.6090* 87 1.3266*
1993(4) 1344 1.4494 4 1.5350 75 1.3319*
— 26 —TABLE 3
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— 27 —TABLE 4
Failure Hazard
(t-ratios in parentheses)
I II III IV V VI
Failure
Criteria Closure Equity< 2% Closure Equity~2% Closure Equity< 2%
CAPAD _81.15** _89.61** _82.07** _91.48** _82.88** _91.70**
(—23.27) (—21.83) (—23.39) (—22.27) (—23.70) (—22.34)
Al 2.395** 3.384** 2.296** 2.694** 1.246* l.903**
(3.11) (4.84) (2.85) (3.56) (1.74) (2.84)
A2 0.3726 0.7942 0.1617 0.6656 0.2035 0.6240
(0.64) (1.56) (0.28) (1.29) (0.34) (1.20)
A3 5.035** 8.245** 6.176** 9.810** 5.336** 9.060**
(3.16) (6.33) (3.73) (7.20) (3.33) (6.92)
lll.2** 96.04** 120.9** 102.4** 120.2** 101.2**
(6.88) (7.53) (7.64) (8.15) (7.62) (8.08)
A5 0.7694 2.436** 0.7945 2.715** 0.6108 2.484**
(1.20) (4.47) (1.20) (4.77) (0.93) (4.41)
Ml 3.226** 4.254** —— ——
(4.17) (6.54)
M2 —— 0.7978** 0.6440**
(3.51) (2.42)
M3 — — —0.03370 0.06189
(—0.08) (0.16)
EARN —1.747 _6.538** _1.782* _6.328** _1.846* _6.423**
(—1.62) (—5.33) (—1.67) (—5.14) (—1.74) (—5.24)
LIQ _5.078** _5.213** _5.823** _5.218** _4.713** _4.417**
(—8.41) (—9.40) (—8.22) (—8.03) (—7.78) (—7.99)
SIZE —0.01653 —0.1285 0.1105 0.03554 0.1606* 0.06398
(—0.17) (—1.40) (1.22) (0.43) (1.88) (0.81)
HOLD —0.08057 —0.2305 —0.1645 _0.2678* —0.1494 _0.2921**
(—0.49) (—1.56) (—0.99) (—1.82) (—0.90) (—1.99)
BR1 _0.5102** —0.2181 _0.5276** —0.1695 _0.5206** —0.1827
(—2.89) (—1.36) (—2.94) (—1.05) (—2.92) (—1.14)
BR2 _0.6694** _0.6016** _0.5192** _0.4144** _0.5775** _0.4868**
(—2.63) (—2.87) (—2.07) (—1.98) (—2.29) (—2.34)
LLF —1134.809 —1532.376 —1132.680 —1539.646 —1137.017 —1542.280
0.3920 0.3290 0.3890 0.3230 0.3870 0.3220
NOTE: Single asterisk (*) denotes significance at .1; double asterisk denotes significance
at .05.
— 28 —TABLE 5
Acquisition Hazard
(t-ratios in parentheses)
VII VIII IX X XI XII
Failure
Criteria Closure Equity< 2% Closure Equity< 2% Closure Equity< 2%
CAPAD _7.294** _8.079** _7.147** _8.059** _7.l28** _8.067**
(—4.62) (—4.87) (—4.43) (—4.74) (—4.43) (—4.75)
Al —0.2692 —0.2106 0.6999** 0.7765** 0.7469** O.7724**
(—0.93) (—0.72) (2.36) (2.57) (3.00) (3.07)
A2 0.4488** 0.4753** 0.4864** 0.5083** o.4940** o.5217**
(2.09) (2.20) (2.28) (2.36) (2.30) (2.41)
A3 —0.4022 —0.5524 —0.1115 —0.1595 —0.05282 —0.1030
(—0.16) (—0.20) (—0.04) (—0.06) (—0.02) (—0.04)
_67.54** _66.10** _71.95** _70.12** _72.02** _70.07**
(—5.58) (—5.42) (—5.95) (—5.76) (—5.96) (—5.76)
A5 —0.3639 —0.3949 —0.2730 —0.3012 —0.2682 —0.2930
(—1.29) (—1.38) (—0.97) (—1.05) (—0.95) (—1.03)
Ml _3.138** _3.065** —— ——
(—6.93) (—6.67)
M2 — — —0.03886 —0.003699
(—0.33) (—0.03)
M3 —— 0.07426 0.1044
(0.43) (0.61)
EARN _7.151** _7.266** _6.773** _6.895** _6.766** _6.878**
(—6.66) (—6.36) (—6.21) (—5.91) (—6.20) (—5.89)
LIQ 3334** _3.384** _3.762** _3.855** _3.789** _3.828**
(—15.11) (—15.12) (—14.63) (—14.78) (—17.65) (—17.61)
SIZE _0.08337** _0.07844** _0.1604** _0.1519** _0.1628** _0.1528**
(—2.28) (—2.13) (—4.33) (—4.05) (—4.44) (—4.13)
HOLD 1.544** 1.537** 1.584** 1.577** 1.586** 1.578**
(20.22) (19.80) (20.68) (20.25) (20.70) (20.26)
BR1 0.1272* 0.1465* 0.09639 0.1188 0.09740 0.1203
(1.70) (1.93) (1.28) (1.56) (1.29) (1.58)
BR2 0.4365** 0.4457** 0.4091** 0.4214** 0.4111** 0.4218**
(5.02) (5.07) (4.69) (4.79) (4.73) (4.81)
LLF —9977.873 —9793.731 —9899.691 —9713.783 —9899.654 —9713.608
R2 0.0650 0.0660 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630
NOTE: Single asterisk (*) denotes significance at .1; double asterisk denotes significance
at .05.
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